LIBERALISM 5 page

Date: 2015-10-07; view: 361.

political *authority. Autonomy in this sense is often linked with *democracy, but may nevertheless also limit the jurisdiction of democracy, as it emphasises individuality rather than collective or majority rule.

CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship is a relationship between the individual and *state, in which the two are bound together by reciprocal *rights and duties. Citizens differ from subjects and aliens in that they are full members of their political community, or state, by virtue of the possession of basic rights. Citizenship is viewed differently depending upon whether it is shaped by *individualism or *communitarianism. The former, linked to *liberalism, advances the principle of a ‘citizenship of rights', and places particular stress upon private entitlement and the status of the individual as an autonomous actor. There are socialist and conservative versions of communitarianism, but each advances the principle of a ‘citizenship of duty', highlighting the importance of civic *responsibility. Such theories tend to portray the state as a moral agency, and to underline the need for *community and the role of social existence.

Significance

The idea that citizenship is the proper end of government can be traced back to the political thought of Ancient Greece, and to the belief that an interest in public affairs is a basic feature of individual existence. Recurrent interest in citizenship therefore reflects an enduring concern for, and commitment to, the ‘public' face of human life. Controversies about citizenship centre upon the rights it implies and its value as a political principle. The political *right tends to endorse a narrow view of citizenship that stresses only civil and political rights, the rights that are exercised within *civil society and rights of participation. The political *left, by contrast, tends to endorse ‘social citizenship', the idea that citizens are entitled to a social minimum, expressed in terms of social and welfare rights. Opponents of the very idea of citizenship include libertarians who reject the notion that individuals have a broader social identity and responsibilities. Marxists may also criticise citizenship

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on the grounds that it masks the reality of unequal class power, while feminists may do so because it takes no account of patriarchal oppression. Nevertheless, the rise of communitarianism and the emergence of ‘new' *social democracy has led to a revival of interest in citizenship, as an attempt to re-establish a ‘rights and responsibilities' agenda and to counterbalance the market individualism of the *New Right. This is usually associated with the idea of ‘active citizenship', a notion that places particular emphasis upon the social duties and moral responsibilities of citizens.

CIVIL LIBERTY

Civil liberty is a ‘private' sphere of existence that belongs to the citizen, not the *state. Civil liberty therefore encompasses a range of ‘negative' *rights, usually rooted in the doctrine of *human rights, which demand non-interference on the part of *government. The classic civil liberties are usually thought to include the right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of movement, and freedom of association. Civil liberties are often confused with civil rights. The former are freedoms from government, while the latter are generally ‘positive' rights, in the sense that they are rights of participation and access to *power. Civil rights campaigns thus typically call for a widening of voting and political rights and for an end to discrimination, rather than for a broadening of civil liberty.

Significance

The maintenance of key civil liberties is generally seen as vital to the functioning of liberal-democratic societies, since they provide the individual with protection against arbitrary government. In many cases the principle of civil liberty is given constitutional expression through documents such as a *bill of rights, and it is widely seen as a basic justification for judicial independence and a strict separation between *law and *politics. The clarity with which civil liberties are defined, and the effectiveness with which they are upheld, are therefore the crucial index of individual *freedom from the liberal perspective. Reservations about civil liberty have nevertheless been expressed by both conservatives and

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socialists. Conservatives have argued that the strengthening of civil liberties tends to weaken government and, in particular, hamper the maintenance of domestic order. Socialists, on the other hand, have warned that the doctrine of civil liberty, especially when applied to property rights, can serve as a defence of social inequality and class oppression.

COLLECTIVISM

Collectivism is, broadly, the belief that collective human endeavour is of greater practical and moral value than individual self-striving. It reflects the idea that *human nature has a social core, and implies that social groups, whether *social classes, *nations, *races or whatever, are meaningful political entities. However, the term is used with little consistency. Michael Bakunin (1814–76) used collectivism to refer to self-governing associations of free individuals, describing his form of *anarchism as collectivist anarchism. More commonly, collectivism is treated as the opposite of *individualism, on the grounds that it implies that collective interests should prevail over individual ones. Collectivism in this sense is often linked to the *state, as the mechanism through which collective interests are upheld against the individual interests of *civil society. This suggests, in stark contrast to Bakunin's use of the term, that the growth of state responsibilities marks the advance of collectivism. It also explains why collectivism is often confused with *collectivisation, the extension of state control over the economy (although collectivisation may be seen as a means of advancing collectivist goals).

Significance

Collectivism has been one of the key components of socialist ideology. The socialist case for collectivism is both moral and economic. Morally, collective endeavour in the form of cooperation fosters social solidarity and a *responsibility for fellow human beings, based upon our common humanity. Economically, collectivism enables the collective energies of society to be harnessed in a rational and efficient fashion, by contrast with self-striving which results in wasteful competition. This emphasis upon collectivism is evident in a traditional socialist belief in *equality, *welfare and

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common ownership. Marxism, indeed, subscribes to a form of methodological collectivism, in that it treats social classes rather than individuals as the principal agents of historical change. However, collectivism is by no means exclusively linked to *socialism, and forms of collectivism can be identified in, for instance, *nationalism, *racialism and *feminism. Two basic objections are usually made to collectivism, both rooted in the ideas of liberal individualism. The first is that collectivism stifles individuality and diversity by insisting upon a common social identity and shared human interests. The second is that collectivism is necessarily, and not accidentally, linked to statism and the erosion of *freedom, as there is no effective means to advance collective interests except through political *authority.

COMMUNITY

A community, in everyday language, is a collection of people in a given location; that is, a village, town, city or even country. As a political or social principle, however, the term community suggests a social group that possesses a strong collective identity based upon the bonds of comradeship, loyalty and duty. Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936) distinguished between Gemeinschaft, or ‘community', typically found in traditional societies and characterised by natural affection and mutual respect, and Gesellschaft, or ‘association', that is, the looser, artificial and contractual relationships typically found in urban and industrialised societies. Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) emphasised the degree to which community is based upon the maintenance of social and moral codes. If these are weakened, this induces ‘anomie', feelings of isolation, loneliness and meaninglessness, which Durkheim associated with the incidence of suicide.

Significance

An emphasis upon community has been a recurrent theme in political thought and can be traced back to Aristotle's (384–322 BCE) assertion that human beings are essentially ‘political animals', although the idea of community has often remained vague and ill-defined. Socialists and traditional conservatives have placed particular emphasis upon community. For socialists it implies

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cooperation and social responsibility and, in its most radical form, it has led to a preference for small, self-managing communities, or communes. For conservatives it is linked to the need to give individuals a secure social identity and sense of rootedness. In the late twentieth century the cause of community was advanced explicitly through the rise of *communitarianism, which set out to redress the ‘atomism' which had resulted from the spread of liberal and individualist values.

Critics of the principle of community point out that it is either politically dangerous or intellectually bogus. The danger of community is that it can lead to individual rights and liberties being violated in the name of the collective body. This was most graphically demonstrated through *Nazism's emphasis upon the Völksgemeinschaft, or ‘national community', which aimed to dissolve individuality, and indeed personal experience, within the social whole. The intellectual limitations of community derive from its tendency to imply the existence of collective identities and social bonds which in fact do not exist. Liberals may therefore point out that there is no such thing as community, but only a collection of individuals. Terms such as ‘gay community' and ‘black community' have come in for particular criticism in this respect.

CONSENT

To consent means to agree or grant permission. As a political principle, consent is normally linked to *authority, as a means through which people agree to be governed and thus to be bound by political *obligation. In practical terms consent is often associated with *elections. However, voters are generally thought to have consented to be governed not specifically through voting for the winning party or candidate, but through having participated in the electoral mechanism and thereby having accepted it as a legitimate means for selecting leaders or establishing a *government.

Significance

Consent is an important principle of *liberalism. In the liberal view, authority and social relationships should always be based upon consent, representing the voluntary actions of free individuals. This

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ensures that authority arises ‘from below', and is always grounded in *legitimacy. The classic expression of this doctrine is that government must be based upon the ‘consent of the governed'. Consent therefore disposes liberals to favour *representation and *democracy. However, they also believe that social bodies and associations should be based upon consent, in that they are formed through contractual agreements willingly entered into by individuals intent on pursuing their own self-interest. In this light, political and other obligations are morally binding because our voluntary agreement implies a promise to uphold them. Objections to the principle of consent stem from the grounds upon which it can be demonstrated and the extent to which individuals can be regarded as free and self-willed actors. Is it, for instance, reasonable to suggest that the act of voting amounts to the granting of consent on the part of the governed? Are those who vote obliged to respect their government and the *laws it makes? Moreover, the idea of consent ignores the capacity of *ideology and government propaganda to shape what people think, and thereby to influence their seemingly voluntary behaviour.

CONSTITUTIONALISM

Constitutionalism, in a narrow sense, is the practice of limited *government brought about through the existence of a *constitution. Constitutionalism in this sense can be said to exist whenever government institutions and political processes are effectively constrained by constitutional rules. More broadly, constitutionalism refers to a set of political values and aspirations that reflect the desire to protect *freedom through the establishment of internal and external checks upon government *power. Constitutionalism is typically expressed in support for constitutional provisions that establish this goal, notably a codified constitution, a *bill of rights, the *separation of powers, *bicameralism and *federalism or *decentralisation.

Significance

Constitutionalism is one of the basic political values of *liberalism and one of the key components of *liberal democracy. Its

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importance rests upon the underlying fear that government is always liable to become a tyranny against the individual, because power is corrupting in itself. Constitutionalism is thus a vital guarantee of liberty. The forms it takes may nevertheless vary considerably. Liberal constitutionalism is usually associated with a written or codified constitution, a system of checks and balances amongst government institutions and formal, and usually entrenched, guarantees for *civil liberty. Nevertheless, the UK system of government has sometimes been regarded as constitutional even though it has traditionally lacked each of these three features. Critics of constitutionalism have pointed out that it gives attention only to the formal and usually legal organisation of government. For instance, constitutions and institutional fragmentation may be less important in maintaining individual liberty than party competition and *democracy. Constitutionalism has also been criticised by socialists as a means of constraining government power and thus of preventing meaningful reform of the capitalist system.

DEMOCRACY

Democracy literally means rule by the demos or people (although the Greeks originally used demos to mean ‘the poor' or ‘the many'). However, the simple notion of ‘rule by the people' is vague and has been subject to a bewildering variety of interpretations (indeed, democracy may equally be treated as a ‘contested' value or be taken to stand for a variety of systems). Perhaps a more helpful starting point is Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address (1864), which extolled the virtues of what he called ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people'. This highlights the importance of three core features of democracy. First, the stress upon ‘the people' implies political *equality, an equal distribution of political *power and influence. Second, *government ‘by' the people emphasises the importance of popular participation. Third, government ‘for' the people highlights the fact that democracy suggests rule in the public interest.

However, there are a number of models of democracy. The most important distinction is between direct democracy and representative democracy. Direct democracy (a term that overlaps with

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classical democracy, radical democracy and participatory democracy) is based upon the direct, unmediated and continuous participation of citizens in the tasks of government. Direct democracy thus obliterates the distinction between government and governed, and between the *state and *civil society; it is a system of popular self-government. It was achieved in ancient Athens through a form of government by mass meeting (Athenian democracy), and its most common modern manifestation is in the use of *referendums. Representative democracy (whose most common form is *liberal democracy) is a limited and indirect form of democracy. It is limited in that popular participation in government is infrequent and brief, being restricted to the act of voting every few years. It is indirect in that the public do not exercise power themselves; they merely select those who will rule on their behalf. This form of rule is democratic only insofar as *representation establishes a reliable and effective link between the government and the governed. This is sometimes expressed in the notion of an electoral *mandate.

Significance

The mass conversion of politicians and political thinkers to the cause of democracy was one of the most dramatic and significant events in political history. Well into the nineteenth century the term continued to have pejorative implications, suggesting a system of ‘mob rule'. Now, however, we are all democrats. Liberals, conservatives, socialists, communists, anarchists and even fascists are eager to proclaim the virtues of democracy and to demonstrate their democratic credentials. Indeed, ‘end of history' theorists interpreted the collapse of *communism in the late twentieth century to imply the worldwide, and final, triumph of liberal democracy. Democratic processes and practices have displaced *authoritarianism basically because political stability in complex and highly differentiated modern societies can be maintained only through a diffusion of *power, a tendency that is strengthened by the development of a better educated and informed and more politically sophisticated citizenry. Overwhelmingly, where democracy has triumphed it has done so in its more practicable, representative form; however, developments in information technology have increasingly made direct democracy more viable, particularly in small communities.

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Most of the debates about democracy stem from rivalries between different theories or models of democracy and concern how, and to what extent, democratic practices should be applied. The most common of these deal with the adequacy of representative democracy and, in particular, the link between *elections and democracy, and whether or not democratic principles should be narrowly confined to political matters or extended more widely to cover, say, the family, the workplace and the distribution of economic power. Nevertheless, key debates about the virtues and vices of democracy remain relevant.Amongst the advantages that have been claimed for democracy are the following:

Amongst the criticisms that have been made of democracy are the following:

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EQUALITY

Equality is the principle of uniform apportionment; it does not imply identity or sameness. Equality, however, is meaningless unless we can answer the question: equal in what? The term equality has very different implications, depending upon what is being apportioned. Foundational equality is the idea that human beings are ‘born equal' in the sense that their lives are of equal moral value. Formal equality refers to the formal status of individuals in society in terms of their *rights and entitlements; its clearest expression is in the form of legal equality (‘equality before the law') and political equality (universal suffrage and one person one vote, one vote one value). Equality of opportunity means that everyone has the same starting-point, or equal life chances. This distinguishes between inequalities that result from unequal social treatment (which are non-legitimate) and ones that result from an unequal distribution of merit, talent and the willingness to work (which are legitimate). Equality of outcome refers to an equal distribution of rewards; it is usually reflected in social equality, an equal distribution of income, wealth and other social goods. These different views of equality are sometimes mutually incompatible. For instance, equality of opportunity may justify unequal social outcomes on the grounds of *meritocracy and the need for incentives.

Significance

The idea of equality is perhaps the defining feature of modern political thought. Whereas classical and medieval thinkers took it for granted that hierarchy is natural or inevitable, few modern ones have not been willing to support equality in one of its various forms. In a sense we are all egalitarians now. The modern battle about equality is therefore fought not between those who support the principle and those who reject it, but between different views about where and how equality should be applied. Although foundational equality as a philosophical principle, and formal equality as a legal and political principle, are widely accepted, at least in liberal-democratic societies, deep controversy continues to surround the idea of equality of outcome or rewards. Indeed, many treat the *left/right political spectrum as a reflection of differing attitudes

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towards social equality, left-wingers broadly supporting it, while right-wingers question or oppose it.Amongst the arguments in favour of social or material equality are the following:

Amongst the arguments against social equality are the following:

FREEDOM

Freedom or liberty (the two terms are best used interchangeably) is, in its broadest sense, the ability to think or act as one wishes. An important distinction is nevertheless made between negative freedom and positive freedom ( Berlin, 1958 ). Negative freedom means non-interference: the absence of external constraints upon the individual. The individual is thus ‘at liberty' to act as he or she wishes. The clearest manifestations of negative freedom are in the form of freedom of choice, *civil liberty and privacy. Positive freedom is linked to the achievement of some identifiable goal or

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benefit, usually personal development or self-realisation, although Berlin defined it as self-mastery and linked it to *democracy. For Berlin the negative/positive distinction was reflected in the difference between being free from something and being free to do something. However, the ‘freedom from' and ‘freedom to' distinction is misleading, because every example of freedom can be described in both ways. For instance, being free from ignorance means being free to gain an education. G. C. MacCallum (1991) proposed a single, value-free concept of freedom in the form: ‘X is free from Y to do or be Z'. This suggests that the apparently deep question ‘are we free?' is meaningless, and should be replaced by a more complete and specific statement about what we are free from, and what we are free to do.

Significance

Freedom is often considered the supreme political value in Western liberal societies. Its virtue is that, attached to the idea that human beings are rationally self-willed creatures, it promises the satisfaction of human interests or the realisation of human potential. In short, freedom is the basis for happiness and well-being. However, despite its popularity, different political thinkers and traditions draw quite different conclusions from their belief in freedom. For classical liberals and supporters of the *New Right, who view freedom in strictly negative terms, it implies rolling back the *state and minimising the realm of political *authority. Indeed, for anarchists, who alone regard freedom as an absolute value, it is irreconcilable with any form of political authority. On the other hand, modern liberals and socialists have tended to subscribe to a positive view of freedom that justifies widening the responsibilities of the state, particularly in relation to *welfare and economic management. The state is regarded as the enemy of freedom when it is viewed as an external constraint upon the individual, but as a guarantee of freedom when it lays down the conditions for personal development and self-realisation. Conservatives, for their part, have traditionally endorsed a weak view of freedom as the willing recognition of duties and responsibilities. This position is taken to its extreme by fascists, who portrayed ‘true' freedom as unquestioning obedience to the leader and the absorption of the individual into the national *community.

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Nevertheless, with the exception of *anarchism, freedom is not regarded as an unqualified blessing. This is reflected in the widely accepted distinction between liberty and licence, the former referring to morally acceptable forms of freedom, the latter to the abuse of freedom or excessive freedom. As R. H. Tawney (1880–1962) put it, ‘The freedom of the pike is death to the minnows.' Above all, freedom must be balanced against *order, and the nature of this balance has been one of the central themes in *political theory. Those who believe that this balance should favour freedom, such as liberals and socialists, generally regard human beings as rational and enlightened creatures, capable of making wise decisions in their own interests. Those, in contrast, who emphasise order over freedom, such as traditional conservatives, usually regard human beings as weak, limited or even corrupt creatures, who need authority to be exercised over them.

In addition to philosophical debates about freedom, political thinkers have sometimes discussed its psychological impact. In sharp contrast to the optimistic expectations of liberal thinkers such as J. S. Mill (1806–73) that freedom will result in human flourishing, writers such as Erich Fromm (1984) have drawn attention to the ‘fear of freedom'. This is the idea that freedom entails psychological burdens in terms of choice and uncertainty, which at times of political instability and economic crisis may incline people to flee from freedom and seek security in submission to an all-powerful leader or totalitarian state. This has been used as an explanation of the rise of *fascism and of *religious fundamentalism.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights are *rights to which people are entitled by virtue of being human; they are a modern and secular version of ‘natural' rights, which were believed to be God-given. Human rights are therefore universal, fundamental and absolute. They are universal in the sense that they belong to all humans everywhere, regardless of nationality, ethnic or racial origin, social background and so on. They are fundamental in that they are inalienable: human rights can be denied or violated but a human being's entitlement to them cannot be removed. They are absolute in that, as the basic grounds for living a genuinely human life, they cannot be qualified (although some argue that all rights are relative as they conflict