LIBERALISM 7 page

Date: 2015-10-07; view: 391.

Significance

Representation is widely viewed as the only practicable form of democracy in modern circumstances. Interest in it developed alongside the wider use of popular election as the principal means of political recruitment, although pre-democratic forms of representation supposedly operated through, for example, the obligation of monarchs to consult major landed, clerical and other interests. The general benefits of representation are that it provides the people with a mechanism through which they can replace unpopular politicians or unsuccessful governments, while relieving ordinary citizens of the everyday burdens of decision-making, thus making possible a division of labour in *politics.

-144-

Representation therefore allows governments to be placed in the hands of those with better education, expert knowledge and greater experience.

Nevertheless, there are very different views about what representation does, or should, imply in practice. Burke's model of trusteeship, for instance, views representation as a moral duty that can be invested in an educated and social elite. Its virtue is that it does not bind representatives to the ill-considered and ignorant views of their constituents, but its disadvantage is that it may allow representatives to advance their own interests or defend the general interests of the social elite. Representation as delegations emerged specifically to counter such tendencies by realising the ideal of popular *sovereignty; however, it appears to rob governments and parliaments of their vital deliberative function as forums of debate and discussion. The doctrine of the mandate has the advantage that it helps to imbue elections with meaning by authorising governments only to carry out policies that have been properly endorsed, but it is questionable whether voters are influenced by issues or policies, and, as with delegation, it allows governments little freedom of debate or manoeuvre. The resemblance model supposedly ensures that representatives can fully identify with the group they represent because they have a common background and shared experiences, but the idea that only a woman can represent women, or only a black person can represent other black people, is perhaps unnecessarily narrow as well as simplistic. Others, however, question the very idea of representation. This is done most commonly by those who argue that representation is simply a substitute for democracy, in that the former always has elitist implications because government is carried out by a small group of professional politicians and the people are kept at arm's length from political *power.

RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility can be understood in three contrasting ways. First, it means to have control or *authority, in the sense of being responsible for something or someone. Personal responsibility thus implies being responsible for oneself and one's own economic and social circumstances, while social responsibility implies being responsible for others. Second, responsibility means *accountability or answerability, in the sense of being responsible to someone. This suggests

-145-

the existence of a higher authority to which an individual or body is subject, and by which it can be controlled. Government is responsible in this sense if its actions are open to scrutiny and criticism by a *parliament or assembly that has the ability to remove it from *power. This also has an important moral dimension: it implies that the government is willing to accept blame and bear an appropriate penalty. Third, responsibility means to act in a sensible, reasonable or morally correct fashion, often in the face of pressure to behave otherwise. A government may thus claim to be responsible when it resists electoral pressures and risks unpopularity by pursuing policies designed to meet long-term public interests.

Significance

Responsibility, as it applies to individuals, has different implications depending upon what citizens are deemed to be responsible for, and to whom. However, the idea of responsible government has clearer applications, linked to the wider use of electoral and democratic procedures. Responsible government, in the sense of accountable government, is usually associated with two important benefits. The first is that it facilitates *representation by binding government to the electorate viewed as a higher authority. Responsible government thus means that the government is responsible to, and removable by, the public, presumably through the mechanism of competitive elections. The second advantage is that it exposes government to scrutiny and oversight, checking the exercise of government power and exposing *policy to analysis and debate. This is a function that is usually vested in the parliament; it is carried out through procedures for debate and questioning and, in a more specific manner, by the use of *committees.

In the UK system, responsible government has been elaborated into the conventions of collective and individual ministerial responsibility. Collective responsibility obliges all ministers to ‘sing the same song', on the grounds that they are collectively responsible to and removable by Parliament. Individual responsibility holds that ministers are personally responsible to Parliament for departmental blunders or policy failures. Nevertheless, the adequacy of responsible government has been widely doubted. This occurs when doctrines of responsibility lose their political edge and become mere constitutional principles. For instance, UK governments have little

-146-

fear of collective responsibility so long as they have majority control of the House of Commons; and individual responsibility no longer, at least in its traditional form, results in ministerial resignations. Responsibility in the sense of governments acting in a morally correct fashion has always been deeply controversial. Its danger is that, by contrast with the idea of accountability, it divorces government from the people by suggesting that only the former has the ability to judge the best interests of the latter. Doubtless, all governments would view themselves as responsible in this sense, supported by the knowledge that no other body could challenge this designation.

RIGHTS

A right is an entitlement to act or be treated in a particular way (although in its original meaning it stood for a power or privilege, as in the rights of the nobility or divine right). Rights, however, can be either legal or moral in character. Legal rights are laid down in *law or in a system of formal rules and so are enforceable. Moral rights, in contrast, exist only as moral claims or philosophical assertions. *Human rights, and their predecessors, natural rights, are essentially moral rights, despite the fact that they have increasingly been translated into international law and sometimes domestic law. A further distinction can be made between negative rights and positive rights. Negative rights are rights that mark out a realm of unconstrained action, and thus impose restrictions upon the behaviour of others, particularly the *government. Traditional *civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and freedom of movement, are therefore negative rights; our exercise of them requires that government and fellow citizens leave us alone. Positive rights are rights that impose demands upon others, and particularly government, in terms of the provision of resources or supports, and thus extend their responsibilities. Social or welfare rights, such as the right to education or the right to benefits, are positive rights. Our exercise of them requires that the government provides services and guarantees social supports.

Significance

The doctrine of rights emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through the idea of natural or God-given rights,

-147-

particularly as used by social contract theorists. Rights thus developed as, and, in an important sense, remain, an expression of liberal *individualism. However, the language of rights has come to be adopted by almost all political traditions and thinkers, meaning that political debate is littered with assertions of rights – the right to education, the right to free speech, the right to abortion, the rights of animals and so on. This reflects the fact that rights are the most convenient means of translating political commitments into principled claims. The most significant divisions over rights therefore focus not upon whether or not they exist, but upon which rights should be given priority and with what implications. Negative rights, for instance, have traditionally been supported by liberals, who see them as a means of defending the individual from arbitrary government, but have been attacked by socialists on the grounds that they may merely uphold private *property and thus class inequality. Positive rights, on the other hand, are favoured by socialists who wish to defend welfare provision and economic intervention, but are condemned by some liberals and supporters of the *New Right because they breed dependency and weaken self-reliance.

Moreover, whereas liberals treat rights as strictly individual entitlements, others have developed the idea of group rights, as in the case of socialist support for trade union rights and the nationalist emphasis upon the rights of national self-determination. The idea of minority rights, in reference to the rights of groups such as women (a minority, of course, only in terms of elite representation), gays, the disabled, children and ethnic minorities, has provoked particular debate. In many cases these are rights of *equality; demands, in other words, for equal treatment on behalf of people who suffer from some form of discrimination or social disadvantage. In other cases minority rights articulate demands that arise from the special needs of particular groups, examples including contraception and abortion rights for women, and mobility rights for people who use wheelchairs. Further controversy has arisen as a result of attempts by ecologists to apply rights to non-humans, most obviously in the form of animal rights, but also more generally in the idea of the rights of the planet.

Nevertheless, some thinkers object to the very idea of rights. Marxists have traditionally portrayed rights as an example of bourgeois *ideology, in that they establish a bogus *equality that disguises the workings of the capitalist class system; utilitarians

-148-

reject rights as nonsense, on the grounds that they constitute untestable philosophical assertions; and conservatives and some communitarians have warned that a ‘culture of rights' breeds egoism and weakens social norms, an obsession with individual rights being a threat to the idea of what is morally right.

TOLERATION

Toleration means forbearance, a willingness to accept views or actions with which one disagrees or of which one disapproves. Toleration should therefore be distinguished from both permissiveness and indifference. Permissiveness is a social attitude that allows people to act as they wish or as they choose; it reflects either moral indifference (the belief that the actions in question cannot be judged in moral terms) or moral relativism (the belief that moral judgements can be made only from the perspective of the individuals concerned). Toleration, on the other hand, is based upon two separate moral judgements. The first is disapproval of a form of behaviour or set of beliefs; the second is a deliberate refusal to impose one's own views on others. Toleration, thus, does not simply mean ‘putting up with' what cannot be changed – for example, a battered wife who stays with her abusive husband out of fear can hardly be said to ‘tolerate' his behaviour. Moreover, toleration does not imply non-interference. Although toleration does not allow for interference with, or constraint upon, others, it allows influence to be exerted through moral example and rational persuasion. A distinction is sometimes made between ‘negative' toleration, a passive acceptance of diversity or willingness to ‘live and let live', and ‘positive' toleration, a celebration of diversity and *pluralism viewed as enriching for all.

Significance

Toleration is a core principle of *liberalism and one of the central values of *liberal democracy. Liberals have usually viewed toleration as a guarantee of individual *freedom and a means of social enrichment. John Locke (1632–1704) defended toleration, particularly religious toleration, on the grounds that the *state has no right to meddle in ‘the care of men's souls'. However, his central argument

-149-

was based upon a belief in human rationality. ‘Truth' will only emerge out of free competition amongst ideas and beliefs and therefore must be left to ‘shift for herself ‘. John Stuart Mill (1806–73) treated toleration as one of the faces of individual liberty, suggesting that it represents the goal of personal *autonomy, and that, in promoting debate and argument, it stimulates the intellectual development and moral health of society at large. Such views are consistent with support for pluralism in its moral, cultural and political forms.

Nevertheless, even liberals recognise the limits of toleration, particularly in the need to protect toleration from the intolerant. This may, for instance, provide a justification for banning antidemocratic and anti-constitutional *political parties, on the grounds that, if they came to power, they would establish dictatorial rule and abolish toleration. Other concerns about toleration include that it places a heavy, perhaps over-heavy, faith upon *rationalism and the ability of people to resist ‘bad' ideas; that it may allow groups with offensive views, such as racists and fascists, to operate legally and gain respectability; and that it weakens society in the sense that it makes it impossible to develop shared values and a common culture.

TRADITION

Tradition refers to ideas, practices or institutions that have endured through time and have therefore been inherited from an earlier period. However, it is difficult to determine precisely how long something has to survive before it can be regarded as a tradition. Tradition is usually thought to denote continuity between generations; traditions are things that have been transmitted from one generation to the next. However, the line between the traditional and the merely fashionable is often indistinct. Tradition should nevertheless be distinguished from both progress and reaction. Whereas progress implies a movement forward, building upon the past, and reaction suggests ‘turning the clock back', reclaiming the past, tradition stands for continuity or conservation: the absence of change.

Significance

Tradition is one of the key principles, some would say the defining principle, of *conservatism. The original conservative justification

-150-

for tradition rested upon the idea of natural *order and the belief that tradition reflected God-given institutions and practices has now effectively been abandoned except by religious fundamentalists. The remaining conservative case for tradition is twofold. First, tradition reflects the accumulated wisdom of the past, institutions and practices that have been ‘tested by time' and should be preserved for the benefit of the living and for generations to come. This is embodied in Edmund Burke's (1729–97) assertion that society is a partnership between ‘those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born'. Second, tradition engenders a sense of belonging and identity in the individual that is rooted in history, and also fosters social cohesion by establishing in society a moral and cultural bedrock. Tradition thus gives people, individually and collectively, a sense of who they are.

However, developments in modern society have generally eroded respect for tradition, lingering forms of traditionalism, such as the neo-conservative defence of traditional values, often being seen as part of the difficult adjustment to a post-traditional society. The most important of these developments has been the accelerating pace of change in technologically advanced societies, and the spread of *rationalism, suggesting that reason and critical understanding are a better test of ‘value' than mere survival. The two most common criticisms of tradition are that it amounts to the ‘despotism of custom' ( J. S. Mill), in that it enslaves the present generation to the past and denies the possibility of progress, and that tradition serves the interests not of the many but of the few, elite groups which dominated past societies.

WELFARE

Welfare, in its simplest form, means happiness, prosperity or wellbeing in general; it implies not merely physical survival but some measure of health and contentment as well. As a political principle, however, welfare stands for a particular means through which social well-being is maintained: collectively provided welfare, delivered by *government, through what is termed a welfare state. The term ‘welfare state' is used either to refer to a *state that assumes broad responsibilities for the social well-being of its citizens, or, more narrowly, to the health, education, housing and social security systems through which these responsibilities are carried out.

-151-

Welfare states nevertheless come in many different shapes or forms. Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguished between three types of welfare state: liberal or ‘limited' welfare states (as in the USA and Australia) aim to provide little more than a ‘safety net' for those in need; conservative or ‘corporate' welfare states (as in Germany) provide a comprehensive range of services that depend heavily upon the ‘paying-in' principle and link benefits closely to jobs; and social democratic or ‘Beveridge' welfare states (as traditionally existed in Sweden and the UK, modelled on the 1942 Beveridge Report) incorporate a system of universal benefits and are based upon national insurance and full employment.

Significance

Interest in welfare emerged during the nineteenth century as industrialisation created a spectre of urban poverty and social division that, in different ways, disturbed conservative, liberal and socialist politicians. Early support for social reform and welfare reflected elite fears about the danger of social *revolution and the desire to promote national efficiency in both economic and military terms, as well as the more radical wish to abolish poverty and counter the injustices of the capitalist system. This, in turn, gave rise to quite different forms of welfare support in different states. Although a welfare *consensus developed in the early post-1945 period as paternalistic conservatives, modern liberals and social democrats unified in support for at least the principle of welfare, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a general retreat from welfare, even among socialists, brought about in part by the pressures of economic *globalisation. Nevertheless, welfare remains one of the central faultlines in ideological debate, dividing pro-welfarist social democrats and modern liberals from anti-welfarist libertarians and supporters of the *New Right.Amongst the arguments in favour of welfare are the following:

-152-

Arguments against welfare include the following:

FURTHER READING

Arblaster, A., Democracy (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1994).

Barbalet, J. M., Citizenship (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988).

Barker, J., Arguing for Equality (London and New York: Verso, 1987).

Barry, N., Welfare (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990).

Bellamy, R. (ed.), Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).

Birch, A. H., Representation (London: Macmillan, 1972).

Freeden, M., Rights (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).

Goodin, R. E. and Pettit, P., A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

Gray, T., Freedom (London: Macmillan, 1990).

Held, D. (ed.), Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

Heywood, A., Political Theory: An Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1999).

Horton, J., Political Obligation (London: Macmillan, 1992).

Kingdom, J., No Such Thing as Society? Individualism and Community (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992).

Mendus, S., Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (London: Macmillan, 1989).

O'Neill, J. (ed.), Modes of Individualism and Collectivism (London: Gregg Revivals, 1993).

Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

Ryan, A., Property (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987).

-153-

Systems

This section examines concepts that refer to the organisation of political power, or the wider institutional arrangements of government.

Systems

ABSOLUTISM

Absolutism is the theory or practice of absolute government. *Government is ‘absolute' in the sense that it possesses unfettered *power: government cannot be constrained by a body external to itself. The most prominent manifestation of absolute government is the absolute *monarchy. However, there is no necessary connection between monarchy and absolute government. Although unfettered power can be placed in the hands of the monarch, it can also be vested in a collective body such as the supreme legislature. Absolutism nevertheless differs from modern versions of *dictatorship, notably *totalitarianism. Whereas absolutist regimes aspire to a monopoly of political power, usually achieved by excluding the masses from *politics, totalitarianism involves the establishment of ‘total power' through the politicisation of every aspect of social and personal existence. Absolutism thus differs significantly from, for instance, *fascism.

Significance

Absolutism was the dominant political form in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was usually linked to the claim that *sovereignty, representing unchallengeable and indivisible legal *authority, resided in the monarchy. Absolutist rule was justified by both rationalist and theological theories. Rationalist theories of absolutism, such as those of Jean Bodin (1530–96) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), advanced the belief that only absolute government can guarantee *order and social stability. Divided sovereignty or challengeable power is therefore a recipe for chaos and disorder. Theological theories of absolutism were based upon the doctrine of divine right, according to which the absolute control

-157-

a monarch exercises over his or her subjects derives from, and is analogous to, the power of God over his creation.

However, absolutist theories are now widely regarded as politically redundant and ideologically objectionable. They are politically redundant because the advance of *constitutionalism and *representation has fragmented power and resulted in a strengthening of checks and balances, and because where dictatorship has survived it has assumed a quite different political character. It is ideologically objectionable because absolutism serves as a cloak for tyranny and arbitrary government, and is, by definition, irreconcilable with ideas such as individual *rights and democratic accountability. Nevertheless, a form of constitutional absolutism can be seen to survive in political systems based upon respect for the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.

AUTHORITARIANISM

Authoritarianism is a belief in, or the practice of, government ‘from above', in which political rule is imposed upon society regardless of its *consent. Authoritarianism thus differs from *authority. The latter rests upon *legitimacy, and in that sense arises ‘from below'. Authoritarianism is a very broad classification of government. It can be associated with monarchical *absolutism, traditional *dictatorships and most forms of military rule; and left-wing and right-wing versions of authoritarianism can be identified, associated, respectively, with *communism and *capitalism. However, authoritarianism is usually distinguished from *totalitarianism, on the grounds that it is primarily concerned with the repression of opposition and political liberty, rather than with the more radical goal of obliterating the distinction between the *state and *civil society. Authoritarian regimes may therefore tolerate a significant range of economic, religious and other freedoms.

Significance

Authoritarianism was the dominant political form in pre-constitutional and pre-democratic societies, usually taking the form of monarchical rule and aristocratic privilege. Theories of authoritarianism can be traced back to thinkers such as Joseph de Maistre

-158-

(1753–1821), who argued that the belief in the principle of authority, as opposed to individual *freedom, is the only reliable means of securing *order. In modern politics, however, authoritarianism is usually viewed as a regime type that differs from both *democracy and totalitarianism. The value of the term is nevertheless limited by the fact that, although authoritarian regimes rely upon command and obedience, they exhibit a wide range of political and ideological features. For example, so-called ‘old' authoritarian regimes, such as Franco's Spain, were often conservative in that they set out to protect traditional elites and de-politicise the masses, while ‘new' authoritarian regimes, commonly found in the developing world, aim to bring about economic mobilisation and, to some extent, rely upon political agitation. Indeed, such regimes may develop authoritarian-populist features which resemble Bonapartism (after Louis Napoleon's regime in France, 1848–70), a style of government that fused personal leadership with conservative *nationalism, or Peronism (after Juan Peron's regime in Argentina, 1946–55), a dictatorship that based its support upon the impoverished masses and the promise of economic and social progress.

However, the stark authoritarian/democratic distinction is often misleading because authoritarian traits can be identified in democratic regimes. Examples of this include the McCarthyite ‘witch hunts' of the 1950s in the USA and Thatcherism in the UK, whose combination of neo-liberal economics and neo-conservative social policies has been interpreted as a form of ‘authoritarian populism' ( Hall and Jacques, 1983 ). Finally, authoritarianism has also been viewed as a psychological or sociological phenomenon linked to either a disposition to obey orders unthinkingly or a rigid insistence upon obedience from subordinates. The classic contribution to this approach to authoritarianism was the idea of the ‘authoritarian personality', developed by Adorno et al. (1950) , which explains unquestioning obedience and rigidity of character in terms of an ‘extreme intolerance to ambiguity'; in other words, it is a response to deep insecurities precipitated by uncertainty and choice.

CAPITALISM

Capitalism is an economic system as well as a form of property ownership. Its central features include the following. First, it is based

-159-

upon generalised commodity production, a ‘commodity' being a good or service produced for exchange – it has market value rather than use value. Second, productive wealth in a capitalist economy is predominantly held in private hands. Third, economic life is organised according to impersonal market forces, in particular the forces of demand (what consumers are willing and able to consume) and supply (what producers are willing and able to produce). Fourth, in a capitalist economy material self-interest and profit maximisation provide the main motivation for enterprise and hard work.

However, there is no such thing as a ‘pure' capitalist system, that is, one not contaminated by socialist and other impurities, such as public ownership, economic management, or collective practices. Moreover, all economic systems are shaped by the historical, cultural and ideological context in which they operate. At least three types of capitalist system can therefore be identified in the modern world. Enterprise capitalism, or free-market capitalism (found in the USA and, since the 1980s, the UK) is characterised by faith in the untrammelled workings of market competition, minimal public ownership, safety-net welfare provision and weak trade unions. Social capitalism, or Rhine –Alpine capitalism (found throughout continental Europe and especially in Germany) is characterised by the idea of a social market; that is, it attempts to balance the disciplines of market competition against the need for social cohesion and solidarity guaranteed by economic and social intervention. Collective capitalism, or ‘tiger' capitalism (found in East Asia generally, and increasingly in China) is characterised by what had been called ‘relational markets', close connections between industry and finance, and between producers and government, and by an emphasis upon collaborative effort sometimes dubbed ‘peoplism'.