Kodak is at death's door; Fujifilm, its old rival, is thriving. Why?

Date: 2015-10-07; view: 799.

Divide the text into logical parts and find appropriate headings for them.

Text 2

Talk about how to make the most of cultural diversity within an organization

Match the words to make word partnerships. Explain their meaning.

Complete the sentences .

1. One of the most important aspects of culture are v….., the principles and beliefs that influence the behaviour and way of life of a particular group or community.

2. Cultures also have different b……, things which people in that culture consider to be true.

3. Differences between cultures can create b……, so that understanding and communication become difficult.

4. Some cultural differences are quite visible, such as d….(the clothes people wear).

5. The most visible difference between cultures is b………, such as styles of greeting, the use of names and ways of interacting in general.

6. If we generalize about a culture and its characteristics, we are in danger of creating s….. .

1.adverse a) statement

2. mental b) behaviour

3. mutual c) diversity

4. cultural d) organization

5. mission e) environment

6. not-for-profit f) goals

7. prevailing g) ability

8. nurturing h) attitudes

Jan 14th 2012

Capitalists quite often invent the technology that destroys their own business. Eastman Kodak is a picture-perfect example. It built one of the first digital cameras in 1975.

That technology, followed by the development of smartphones that double as cameras, has battered Kodak's old film- and camera-making business almost to death.

Strange to recall, Kodak was the Google of its day. Founded in 1880, it was known for its pioneering technology and innovative marketing. “You press the button, we do the rest,” was its slogan in 1888.By 1976 Kodak accounted for 90% of film and 85% of camera sales in America. Until the 1990s it was regularly rated one of the world's five most valuable brands.

Then came digital photography to replace film, and smartphones to replace cameras. Kodak's revenues peaked at nearly $16 billion in 1996 and its profits at $2.5 billion in 1999. The consensus forecast by analysts is that its revenues in 2011 were $6.2 billion. It recently reported a third-quarter loss of $222m, the ninth quarterly loss in three years. In 1988, Kodak employed over 145,000 workers worldwide; at the last count, barely one-tenth as many. Its share price has fallen by nearly 90% in the past year.

For weeks, rumours have swirled around Rochester, the company town that Kodak still dominates, that unless the firm quickly sells its portfolio of intellectual property, it will go bust.

While Kodak suffers, its long-time rival Fujifilm is doing rather well. The two firms have much in common. Both enjoyed lucrative near-monopolies of their home markets: Kodak selling film in America, Fujifilm in Japan. A good deal of the trade friction during the 1990s between America and Japan sprang from Kodak's desire to keep cheap Japanese film off its patch.

Both firms saw their traditional business rendered obsolete. But whereas Kodak has so far failed to adapt adequately, Fujifilm has transformed itself into a solidly profitable business, with a market capitalization, even after a rough year, of some $12.6 billion to Kodak's $220m. Why did these two firms fare so differently?

Both saw change coming. Larry Matteson, a former Kodak executive who now teaches at the University of Rochester's Simon School of Business, recalls writing a report in 1979 detailing, fairly accurately, how different parts of the market would switch from film to digital, starting with government reconnaissance, then professional photography and finally the mass market, all by 2010. He was only a few years out.

Fujifilm, too, saw omens of digital doom as early as the 1980s. It developed a three-pronged strategy: to squeeze as much money out of the film business as possible, to prepare for the switch to digital and to develop new business lines.

Both firms realized that digital photography itself would not be very profitable. “Wise businesspeople concluded that it was best not to hurry to switch from making 70 cents on the dollar on film to maybe five cents at most in digital,” says Mr Matteson. But both firms had to adapt; Kodak was slower.